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Abstract. This paper describes two locally-differential private algo-
rithms for releasing user vectors such that the Jaccard similarity between
these vectors can be efficiently estimated. The basic building block is the
well known MinHash method. To achieve a privacy-utility trade-off, Min-
Hash is extended in two ways using variants of Generalized Randomized
Response and the Laplace Mechanism. A theoretical analysis provides
bounds on the absolute error and experiments show the utility-privacy
trade-off on synthetic and real-world data. The paper ends with a critical
discussion of related work.
1 Introduction
Privacy of user data is becoming an ever increasing need for organizations and
users alike. Multiple large-scale privacy breaches in the last years showed how
critical and vulnerable most of today’s infrastructure is [8]. In particular, there
is dispute about the concept of a trusted data curator to whom users send their
original data, and who uses this data to build models for different tasks such as
targeted advertisement. As Kearns and Roth put it in their recent book about
ethical algorithms [10], “[to] make sure that the effect of these models respect
the societal norms that we want to maintain, we need to learn how to design
these goals directly into our algorithms.” In pursue of this goal, the present paper
studies how we can implicitly incorporate privacy into a similarity search system.
The concept of differential privacy as introduced by Dwork et al. in [7] defines
privacy in a precise mathematical way that often allows the design of efficient
randomized algorithms. In the case of an untrusted data curator, the concept can
be extended to local differential privacy, where users themselves run randomized
algorithms to make their data private before sending it to an untrusted curator.
This paper proposes two randomized mechanisms when users have a collection
of items and are interested in finding their similarity with other users under the
Jaccard similarity in a private manner. The proposed algorithms build upon the
papers [11,4,17] and a precise account of the relation will be given in the related
work section at the end of this paper. In a nutshell, each user starts by applying
MinHash as introduced by Broder [1] with the range compression of Li and
König [12] (Section 3.1) to produce a sketch of their data. It is well known that
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these sketches can be used to efficiently estimate the original Jaccard similarity.
Now, each user applies a local randomization to their sketch to satisfy the notion
of differential privacy as introduced in the next section. One randomization
mechanism is based on the concept of randomized response (Section 4), the
other mechanism uses the concept of Laplacian noise (Section 5). We provide
probabilistic bounds on the estimation error of these mechanisms as Theorem 2
and Theorem 3. A running example of our setting and the mechanisms is provided
in Appendix C. The mechanisms will be evaluated in a real-world setting in
Section 6. There we will see that they allow for precise similarity estimations if
user vectors do not contain too few elements.
We hope that the proposed methods will help in building privacy-preserving
similarity search systems with good utility and precise privacy guarantees.
2 (Local) Differential Privacy
Differential privacy conveys a precise mathematically definition of privacy. It
says that a randomized algorithm is private if for two “neighboring” databases,
there must be a “good enough” probability that the algorithm produces the same
output. Here, a clean definition of neighboring is a key criterion and we will
introduce our notion in the next section. While differential privacy usually works
with a trusted data curator, the notion of local differential privacy describes the
setting in which the user apply the randomized algorithm themselves. Thus, the
curator never sees the original data.
Definition 1 (Sect. 12.1 [8]). Let ε, δ ≥ 0. Let A be a randomized algorithm
with output space R. A satisfies (ε, δ)-local differential privacy ((ε, δ)-LDP), if
and only if for any neighboring input x and y we have: ∀v ∈ R : Pr[A(x) = v] ≤
eε Pr[A(y) = v] + δ.
Note that A is run by each individual user.
3 Basic Setup
Let U be a collection of n users and I be a collection of m items. Each user
has a subset of the items. Formally, user u ∈ U is associated with a bit vector
xu = (X1, . . . , Xm) ∈ {0, 1}m, where Xi = 1 means that item i is present in the
user’s item set. From a practical point of view, such a representation is often
obtained from a real-valued vector (X ′1, . . . , X
′
m) ∈ Rm by setting Xi = 1 iff
X ′i ≥ t, for some chosen threshold t ∈ R.
This paper will focus on the similarity of user’s item sets with regard to
their Jaccard similarity. For two vectors x, y ∈ {0, 1}m, the Jaccard similarity
J(x, y) = |x ∩ y|/|x ∪ y| is the fraction of positions with a common one over the
number of positions with at least a one.
We want to release the matrix M = (xu)u∈U ∈ {0, 1}n×m in a locally dif-
ferential private way. This means that each user locally produces a differential
private version x̂u of xu such that if two vectors xu and yu do not differ by much,
there is a good chance that they map to the same output. Sending all x̂u to an
untrusted curator, we obtain a matrix M̂ = (x̂u)u∈U that can be published. The
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utility of this mapping M 7→ M̂ is the ability to recover from any two vectors
x̂ and ŷ their original similarity J(x, y). Since the mapping introduced random
noise to preserve privacy, custom similarity estimation algorithms are required
to solve this task.
Neighboring Notion. Throughout this paper, we will often make the assump-
tion that each user vector has at least τ ≥ 1 items, i.e., at least τ bits are set.
We say that two vectors x and y in {0, 1}m are neighboring if they differ in at
most α positions. In this case, J(x, y) ≥ 1− α/τ .
Basic Building Blocks of Differential Privacy. We review the Laplace
mechanism [8, Chapter 3.3] to produce differential privacy mechanisms in our
context. The `1-sensitivity ∆(f) of a function f : {0, 1}m → RK is defined as
∆(f) = max ‖f(x)− f(y)‖1, where the maximum is taken over all neighboring
bitstrings x, y. Given f(x) ∈ RK and a privacy budget ε, the Laplace mechanism
returns the value f(x)+(Y1, . . . , YK), where each Yi is drawn independently from
the Laplace distribution with shape parameter ∆(f)/ε and mean 0.
Theorem 1 (Thm 3.6 [8]). The Laplace mechanism preserves (ε, 0)-LDP.
Another way of preserving (ε, 0)-LDP is via generalized randomized response [16].
The variant used in this paper will be described in Lemma 2.
3.1 Jaccard Similarity Estimation via MinHash
MinHash. Our approach relies on the MinHash algorithm that was first described
by Broder in [1]. Choosing a MinHash function h : {0, 1}m → [m] := {1, . . . ,m}
amounts to choosing a random permutation π over [m]. The hash value of
x ∈ {0, 1}m is the position of the first 1 in x under π. MinHash has the property
that for any pair x, y ∈ {0, 1}m, we have Pr[h(x) = h(y)] = J(x, y) where the
probability is taken over the random choice of h. Repeating this construction K
times results in an output (h1(x), . . . , hK(x)) ∈ [m]K . By linearity of expectation,
the value 1K
∑K
i=1[hi(x) = hi(y)] is an unbiased estimator of J(x, y).
b-bit MinHash. Li and König described in [12] the following twist to the
standard MinHash approach. For an integer B ≥ 2, choosing a range-B MinHash
function amounts to choosing a MinHash function hmin : {0, 1}m → [m] and a
universal hash function [2] huni : [m]→ [B]. The range-B MinHash function is
h := huni ◦ hmin : {0, 1}m → [B]. This mapping has the property that Pr[h(x) =
h(y)] = (1− J(x, y))1/B + J(x, y), since with probability J(x, y) the MinHash
value is identical—which yields a collision—and with probability 1− J(x, y) the
MinHash value is different but the random mapping generates a collision. [12]
discussed the case B = 2b for b ≥ 1 where the hash function gives a b-bit value.
In this paper we will use their approach for general B ≥ 2.
3.2 Generalized Randomized Response for Close Vectors
To have a chance for good utility of our mechanisms, we will use the additive
δ summand available in LDP (cf. Def 1) to collect cases where the mapping h
maps two neighboring user vectors far away from each other. We then provide
ε-LDP on the remaining cases. We will need two technical lemmata.
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Lemma 1. Let x, y ∈ {0, 1}m such that J(x, y) ≥ 1 − α/τ . Let δ > 0. Let
h1, . . . , hK be a collection of K random range-B MinHash functions. Let x
∗ =
(h1(x), . . . , hK(x)) and y
∗ = (h1(y), . . . , hK(y)). With probability at least 1− δ,
the number of positions where x∗ and y∗ differ is at most K(α/τ)
(
1− 1B
)
+√
3 ln(1/δ)
(
1− 1B
)
Kα/τ .
Proof. For each i ∈ [K], define the random variable Xi = [hi(x) 6= hi(y)]. Let
X =
∑K
i=1Xi denote the number of differences between x
∗ and y∗. Since all
Xi are independent and Pr(Xi = 1) = (1− J(x, y))
(
1− 1B
)
≤ α/τ
(
1− 1B
)
, we
have E[X] ≤ Kα/τ
(
1− 1B
)
. Using the Chernoff bound Pr(X > (1 + β)E[X]) ≤
exp
(
−β2/3E[X]
)
[5, Theorem 1.1] with β =
√
3 ln(1/δ)/E[X] proves the lemma.
The next lemma shows that we can avoid loosing a factor K in the privacy
budget1 when using generalized randomized response [16] on vectors with few
differences.
Lemma 2. Fix ε > 0. Let x, y ∈ [B]K be two arbitrary vectors that differ in
at most L positions. Let ε′ = ε/L. Let A be generalized randomized response
mapping from z ∈ [B]K to z∗ ∈ [B]K such that with probability eε′/(eε′ +B − 1)
we have that z∗i = zi, and otherwise z
∗
i is uniformly picked from [B]−{zi}. Then
A is ε-differentially private.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary v ∈ [B]K . We have to show that Pr[A(x)=v]Pr[A(y)=v] ≤ e
ε. Let
the set Ix,v collect all positions in which xi = vi, and let Nx,v collect all po-
sitions in which xi 6= vi. We observe that Pr[A(x) = v] =
∏
i∈Ix,v
eε
′
eε′+B−1 ·∏
i∈Nx,v
1
eε′+B−1 . The expression for Pr[A(y) = v] follows analogously. Let
D = {i | xi 6= yi} denote all positions where x and y differ. Because all terms
where x and y are identical cancel out, we may conclude that
Pr[A(x) = v]
Pr[A(y) = v]
=
∏
i∈Ix,v∩D
eε
′
eε′+B−1
∏
i∈Nx,v∩D
1
eε′+B−1∏
i∈Iy,v∩D
eε′
eε′+B−1
∏
i∈Ny,v∩D
1
eε′+B−1
≤
∏
i∈D
eε
′
eε′+B−1
1
eε′+B−1
≤ eε
′L=eε.
4 LDP Sketches via Generalized Randomized Response
This section introduces an (ε, δ)-locally differential private algorithm to produce
the user vectors x̂u using generalized randomized response.
The idea of the following algorithm is that each user receives the description
of K range-B MinHash functions that map from [m] to [B] for B ≥ 2. Each
user applies the range-B MinHash functions and perturbs the hash value using
a variant of generalized randomized response [16]. We proceed to describe the
RRMinHash approach. An example is given in Figure 3 in Appendix C, top row.
1 Traditionally, a standard application of the composition theorem [8] shows that the
composition of K ε-DP mechanisms satisfies (Kε)-DP.
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Preprocessing. Each user accessesK ≥ 1 range-B MinHash functions h1, . . . , hK
shared among all users. Each user u applies h1, . . . , hK to their vector xu to obtain
x∗u ∈ [B]K . Now, each position of x∗u is perturbed using generalized randomized
response (Lemma 2) with an individual privacy budget of ε′ = ε/L to generate
the response x̂u, where L is an upper bound on the number of differences between
neighboring user vectors as in Lemma 1. x̂u is the public response of user u.
Lemma 3. The randomized mechanism x 7→ x̂ is (ε, δ)-LDP.
Proof. Fix ε, δ > 0 and let x, y ∈ {0, 1}m such that they differ in at most α
positions. By Lemma 1, with probability at least 1 − δ, the vectors x∗ and y∗
differ in at most L = dK(α/τ)
(
1− 1B
)
+
√
3 ln(1/δ)
(
1− 1B
)
Kα/τe positions.
If x∗ and y∗ differ in at most L positions, Lemma 2 guarantees that the mapping
x∗ 7→ x̂ is ε-differential private.
Similarity Estimation. Given two responses x̂ ∈ [B]K and ŷ ∈ [B]K , count
collisions to obtain pcol =
∑
[x̂i = ŷi]/K. Given pcol, B, and p
∗ = eε
′
/(eε
′
+B−1),
we estimate the Jaccard similarity of x and y as
ĴRR(x̂, ŷ) =
(B − 1)(B · pcol − 1)
(B · p∗ − 1)2
(1)
Lemma 4. ĴRR(x̂, ŷ) is an unbiased estimator of J(x, y).
Proof. We proceed in two parts. First, we calculate the probability of the event
“x̂i = ŷi”. Next, we connect this probability to the estimation given above.
To compute the collision probability, we split up the probability space in two
stages. In the first stage, we condition on the events “x∗i = y
∗
i ” and “x
∗
i 6= y∗i ”,
i.e. on whether the range-B MinHash values collide or not. In the second stage,
we calculate the probability that the perturbed responses collide. As discussed
in Section 3.1, a random range-B MinHash function has the property that
Pr[x∗i = y
∗
i ] =
(B−1)J(x,y)+1
B .
Given that x∗i = y
∗
i , we observe x̂i = ŷi if both keep their answer, or if both
change their answer to the same of the other B − 1 possible responses. Since
both pick a choice uniformly at random, this means that Pr[x̂i = ŷi | x∗i = y∗i ] =
(p∗)2 + (1−p
∗)2
B−1 . Consider that the event x
∗
i 6= y∗i happened. In this case, we
observe a collision of the perturbed values in the following cases: (i) one response
is truthful, the other is changed and picks the truthful response as answer, and
(ii) both responses are obtained by changing the answer, and they both choose
the same answer at random. Computing these probabilities, we conclude that
Pr[x̂i = ŷi | x∗i 6= y∗i ] = 2p∗ (1− p∗) 1B−1 + (1 − p
∗)2
(
1− 1B−1
)2
1
B−2 . The last
term is obtained by first conditioning that neither choice picks the other’s truthful
answer, and then using the random choice of the remaining B − 2 buckets.
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Putting everything together, we obtain
Pr[x̂i = ŷi] =
(B − 1)J(x, y) + 1
B
(
(p∗)2 +
(1− p∗)2
B − 1
)
+
(
1− (B − 1)J(x, y) + 1
B
)(
2p∗ (1−p∗) 1
B−1
+(1−p∗)2
(
1− 1
B−1
)2
1
B−2
)
.
Simplifying this formula by collecting terms yields
Pr[x̂i = ŷi] =
J(x, y) +BJ(x, y)p∗(Bp∗ − 2) +B − 1
B(B − 1)
. (2)
Solving (2) for J(x, y) and using linearity of expectation to connect pcol to
Pr[x̂i = ŷi] results in (1).
Utility Analysis. Next we will discuss probabilistic bounds on the absolute
error that the similarity estimation algorithm achieves on the private vectors.
This means that we want upper bound the value |ĴRR(x̂, ŷ) − J(x, y)|. In the
following, we will consider the absolute error in the case ĴRR(x̂, ŷ) > J(x, y). The
case ĴRR(x̂, ŷ) < J(x, y) follows by symmetry.
Lemma 5. With probability at least 1− δ,
|ĴRR(x̂, ŷ)− J(x, y)| ≤
√
3 ln(1/δ)B3(1 + p∗(Bp∗ − 2))
K(Bp∗ − 1)4
. (3)
Proof. Fix x and y. We let Xi be the indicator variable for the event “x̂i = ŷi”.
Define X = X1 + · · ·+XK . By (2) we know that Xi is Bernoulli-distributed with
q := Pr[Xi = 1] =
J(x,y)+BJ(x,y)p∗(Bp∗−2)+B−1
B(B−1) . Again using a Chernoff bound,
we see that with probability at least 1− δ, X ≤ E[X] +
√
E[X]3 ln(1/δ). Assume
from here on that this inequality holds. From (1), we start by observing that
ĴRR(x̂, ŷ)=
(B − 1)(B ·X/K−1)
(B · p∗ − 1)2
≤
(B − 1)(B(E[X] +
√
E[X]3 ln(1/δ))/K − 1)
(B · p∗ − 1)2
Lem 4
= J(x, y)+
(B − 1)B
√
E[X]3 ln(1/δ)
K(Bp∗ − 1)2
<J(x, y)+
√
3 ln(1/δ)B3(1+p∗(Bp∗−2))
K(Bp∗ − 1)4
.
Theorem 2. Fix ε, δDP, δfail > 0. There exists B and K such that with probabil-
ity at least 1− δfail,|ĴRR(x̂, ŷ)− J(x, y)| = O(
√
α/(τ · ε)). The constant hidden
in the big-Oh notation depends on δDP and δfail.
Proof. Lemma 5 tells us that for every choice of B and K, with probability at
least 1− δfail it holds that
|ĴRR(x̂, ŷ)− J(x, y)| ≤
√
3 ln(1/δ)B3(1 + p∗(Bp∗ − 2))
K(Bp∗ − 1)4
. (4)
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Since p∗ ≤ 1, we continue to bound the right-hand side of (4) by
√
3 ln(1/δfail)
K ·
B2/(Bp∗−1)2. Assume that Bp∗ ≥ 2, which means that ε′ ≥ ln(2(B−1)/(B−2))
and ε ≥ L ·ε′. Since 1/(x−1) ≤ 2/x for x ≥ 2, we continue to bound the absolute
error from above by
√
3 ln(1/δfail)
K ·B
2(2/(Bp∗))2 ≤
√
48 ln(1/δfail)
K (1+(B−1)/e
ε′)2.
Now, we may set B = 3 since it makes the numerator as small as possible. (B = 2
is no valid choice because of the assumption Bp∗ ≥ 2.) Choosing K = Θ(τε/α),
the absolute error is bounded by Θ(
√
α/(τε)) for all ε ≥ L ln 4.
5 LDP Sketches via the Laplace Mechanism
This section introduces an (ε, δ)-LDP protocol for generating private user vectors
x̂u using the Laplace Mechanism. As before, for fixed integers B and K, we use
K range-B MinHash functions such that each user produces a sketch in [B]K .
Let x and y be neighboring vectors and let x∗ and y∗ be the two sketches in
[B]K . As before, with probability at least 1− δ, we can assume that x∗ and y∗
differ in at most L = K(α/τ)
(
1− 1B
)
+
√
3 ln(1/δ)
(
1− 1B
)
Kα/τ positions.
Before we can use Theorem 1, we have to compute the sensitivity ∆ of the
local sketches under the assumption that neighboring vectors differ in at most L
positions. Since each coordinate in which the two vectors differ contributes at
most B − 1 to the `1 norm, the sensitivity is at most ∆ := L(B − 1). According
to Theorem 1, adding Laplace noise with scale ∆/ε to x∗ to produce x̂ guarantees
(ε, 0)-differential privacy as long as the number of differences is at most L. With
probability at most δDP, there are more than L differences. We are now ready to
describe the NoisyMinHash approach, see the example in Figure 3, bottom row.
Preprocessing. Let K,B,α, and τ be integers, and let ε > 0 and δ > 0
be the privacy budget. Choose K range-B MinHash functions h1, . . . , hK and
distribute them to the users. Each user with vector x returns x̂ = (h1(x) +
Nx,1, . . . , hK(x) + Nx,K) ∈ RK , where each Nx,i ∼ Lap(∆/ε) with ∆ = (B −
1)
(
K(α/τ)
(
1− 1B
)
+
√
3 ln(1/δ)
(
1− 1B
)
Kα/τ
)
.
Similarity Estimation. Given x̂ and ŷ from RK , return
ĴLap(x̂, ŷ) =
(B2 − 1)K − 6
∑K
i=1(x̂i − ŷi)2 + 24K(∆/ε)2
(B − 1)(B + 1)K
. (5)
Notably, the estimation algorithm just computes the squared Euclidean distance
and adjusts for the noise added.
Lemma 6. ĴLap(x̂, ŷ) is an unbiased estimator for J(x, y).
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Proof. Given x and y from {0, 1}m, apply NoisyMinHash to compute x̂, ŷ ∈ RK .
Using linearity of expectation, we proceed as follows:
E
[
K∑
i=1
(x̂i − ŷi)2
]
=
K∑
i=1
E[(x̂i − ŷi)2] = KE[((h1(x)− h1(y)) + (Nx,1 −Ny,1))2]
= KE[(h1(x)−h1(y))2+2(h1(x)−h1(y))(Nx,i−Ny,i)+(Nx,i −Ny,i)2]
(1)
= K(E[(h1(x)−h1(y))2] + E[(Nx,i −Ny,i)2])
(2)
= KE[(h1(x)−h1(y))2] + 2KVar[Nx,i] = KE[(h1(x)−h1(y))2] + 4K(∆/ε)2.
In our calculations, both (1) and (2) used that Nx,i and Ny,i are independently
chosen, E[Nx,i] = E[Ny,i] = 0, and Var[Ny,i] = 2(∆/ε)
2.
Let x∗ = h1(x) and y
∗ = h1(y). We continue by calculating E[(x
∗ − y∗)2] as
B−1∑
j=1
j2 Pr[|x∗ − y∗| = j] =
B−1∑
j=1
j2
(B−1)(1−J(x, y))
B
Pr[|x∗−y∗|=j | x∗ 6= y∗]
(1)
=
B−1∑
j=1
j2
(B − 1)(1− J(x, y))
B
2(B − j)/B = 2(B−1)(1−J(x, y))
B2
B−1∑
j=1
j2(B − j)
=
2(B − 1)(1− J(x, y))
B2
· B
2
12
(B + 1)(B − 1) = (B − 1)
2(B + 1)(1− J(x, y))
6
,
where (1) is obtained by noticing that for a fixed x∗ (with B choices), there are
B− 2j choices with two y∗ such that |x∗− y∗| = j, and there are 2j choices with
only one choice y∗. Putting everything together, we summarize
E
[
K∑
i=1
(x̂i − ŷi)2
]
=
K(B − 1)2(B + 1)(1− J(x, y))
6
+ 4K(∆/ε)2.
The result is obtained by rearranging terms.
Utility Analysis.
Theorem 3. Fix ε, δDP, δfail > 0. There exists B and k such that with probability
at least 1−δfail, |ĴLap(x̂, ŷ)−J(x, y)| = Õ
(
(α/τ)4/5 · ε−2/5
)
. The constant hidden
in the big-Oh notation depends on δDP and δfail, and the tilde notation suppresses
polylogarithmic factors.
Proof. We first describe and analyze the two events which constitute the failure
probability δfail. Next we proceed to analyze the estimation error under the
condition that none of these events occur. We will only analyze the case that
ĴLap(x̂, ŷ) is larger than J(x, y). The other case follows by symmetry.
First, we assume that the number of differences between x∗ and y∗ (among the
K functions) does not differ by more than a value L′ from its expectation. This
is true for L′ =
√
3 ln(2/δfail)
(
1− 1B
)
Kα/τ by Lemma 1 for failure probability
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δfail/2. Second, we use Theorem 3.8 in [8] (reproduced in Appendix B) that says
that with probability at least 1− δfail/4, the maximum absolute difference in a
coordinate of x̂ compared to x∗ is at most D = ln(4K/δfail)∆/ε.
By a union bound, with probability at least 1 − δfail none of these events
occur, i.e., we observe a deviation of at most L′ in the number of differences of
two vectors x∗ and y∗ from their expectation, and the Laplace noise added to
both x∗ and y∗ keeps all coordinates within D in their absolute value. Under
this condition, we will study the value |X − E[X]| for the random variable
X =
∑K
i=1(x̂i − ŷi)2. If this value is at most t, the absolute estimation error is at
most 6t(B−1)(B+1)K , cf. (5).
As in the proof of Lemma 6, we split up x̂i into x
∗
i and Ni to calculate∑K
i=1(x̂i − ŷi)2 =
∑K
i=1
(
(x∗i − y∗i )2 + 2(x∗i − y∗i )(Ni −Nj) + (Ni −Nj)2
)
. By
our second condition, we may assume that |Ni −Nj | ≤ 2D, which means that
the last summand is at most 4KD2 over the whole sum. For the first summand,
we use the first condition that says that the number of observed differences is
within L′ from its expectation. Since each individual term in the sum contributes
at most (B − 1)2, the deviation from the expectation over the whole sum is not
more than (B − 1)2L′. Lastly, using both conditions, the contribution of the
middle term over the whole sum is bounded by 4D(Kα/τ(1− 1/B) + L′).
Using P := Kα/τ(1− 1/B) and rewriting L′ =
√
3P ln(2/δfail), we can put
the observations from above together and conclude that with probability at least
1− δfail the estimation error is
O
(
(B − 1)2
√
3P ln(2/δfail) +KD
2 +D(P +
√
3P ln(2/δfail))
(B − 1)(B + 1)K
)
.
Comparing the second and the third term of the sum, we notice that D >
(B − 1)(P +
√
P ) for ε > 1, so the second term is always larger than the third
and we may bound the estimation error by O
(
(B−1)2
√
3P ln(2/δfail)+KD
2
(B−1)(B+1)K
)
. The
function (x− 1)2/((x− 1)(x+ 1)) is monotonically increasing for x ≥ 1, so the
choice B = 2 minimizes the expression above. Now, observe that the first term
is O(
√
α/(Kτ)) and the second term is Õ((αK/τε)2), where the tilde notation
suppresses the logarithmic dependence on K. To balance the estimation error,
we set these terms in relation to each other and solve for K. This shows that
the asymptotic minimum is achieved for K = ε4/5(τ/α)3/5. Using this value to
bound the estimation error results in the bound stated in the theorem.
Comparing RRMinHash and NoisyMinHash. Comparing Thm. 2 to Thm. 3,
both analyses provide bounds on the absolute error in terms of the length τ of
individual vectors, the neighboring notion α, and the privacy budget ε.
Since the value α/τ is between 0 and 1, the contribution of (α/τ)4/5 to
the error of NoisyMinHash (Theorem 3) is smaller than the term (α/τ)1/2 for
RRMinHash. However, the ε−1/2 dependence of RRMinHash is better than ε−2/5
for ε ≥ 1. This should mean that while NoisyMinHash might guarantee smaller
error for small epsilon settings, the error decreases faster for RRMinHash.
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In both mechanisms, the preprocessing time to generate a private vector is
O(Kτ) for a vector with τ set bits. It consists of evaluating K range-B MinHash
functions (each taking time O(τ)) and sampling O(K) values from a uniform
(RRMinHash) or Laplace distribution (NoisyMinHash). The similarity estimation
of two vectors takes time O(K). A private vector for RRMinHash consists of K bits
and the similarity estimation uses the Hamming distance, while NoisyMinHash
uses K floating point values and uses Euclidean distance as basis for similarity
estimation. Given the difficulty of correctly implementing the Laplace Mecha-
nism [13], RRMinHash has a simpler basis for a correct implementation.
6 Experimental Evaluation
All algorithms described in this paper where implemented in Python 3. The
code, raw results, and evaluation notebooks can be accessed at https://github.
com/maumueller/ldp-jaccard. Due to space restrictions, we only present a few
selected results. See the Jupyter notebook at the web page for additional plots
and tables.
Experimental setting. We conduct experiments in two different directions.
First, we create artificial vectors and test how well the algorithms estimate
Jaccard similarity for a fixed privacy budget. We use the mean absolute error
as our quality measure, which is defined as 1`
∑`
i=1 |di − ei| for true similarities
d1, . . . , d` and their estimates e1, . . . , e` returned by the algorithm. In the experi-
ment, we create user vectors x with τ ∈ {20, 50, 100, 250, 500, 1000, 2000} entries.
For each such x, we create vectors y′ with τ entries and Jaccard similarity in
{0.1, 0.5, 0.9} to x. The number K of hash functions considered is chosen from
{10, 20, 30, . . . , 500}. For each algorithm, we vary the privacy budget and internal
parameters such as the range B of the MinHash functions. All runs were repeated
100 times with random hash functions.
Second, we study how well these algorithms work on real-world datasets.
Following [17], we chose the MovieLens and Last.FM dataset available at https:
//grouplens.org/datasets/hetrec-2011. We obtain a set representation by
collecting all movies rated at least 4 (MovieLens, m = 65 536) and the top-20
artists (Last.FM, m = 18 739 ). The average set size is 178.1 (σ = 187.5) and
19.8 (σ = 1.78), respectively. To account for the influence of the size of the
user vectors, we create different versions of these datasets. From the MovieLens
dataset, we make three versions containing all users that have at least 50, 100,
and 500 entries, respectively. This results in datasets with 1636, 1205, and 124
users. From the Last.FM dataset, we collect all users that have at least 20 entries
which amounts to 1860 users. For each dataset, we take 50 query points at random
among all data points for which the 10-th nearest neighbor has at least Jaccard
similarity 0.1. As quality measure, we use recall@k (R@k) which measures the
average number of times that the (index of the) true nearest neighbor is found
among the first k nearest neighbors in the private vectors. (Note that the true
vectors are not revealed, so there cannot be a re-ranking step as is tradition
in nearest neighbor search.) Moreover, we report on the approximate similarity
ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the sum of similarities to the 10 original
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Fig. 1. Results on synthetic vectors with τ ∈ {50, 500, 2000}, privacy budget ε ∈ {4, 6},
and vectors with Jaccard similarity of 0.5. Blue, red, green lines represent runs with
choice of 2, 3, 5 for B, respectively; top: RRMinHash, bottom: NoisyMinHash.
nearest neighbors, and the sum of similarities to the 10 nearest neighbors among
the private vectors computed with their original similarities.
For the whole evaluation, we will use range-2 MinHash (i.e., 1-bit MinHash [12])
with K ≤ 100 as a baseline for comparison. For all experiments, we set α = 1, i.e.
we allow for a single item change. Results for other values can be read off the plots
by looking at different τ values. For example, a combination (α = 1, τ = 500) is
identical to (α = 10, τ = 50) since all bounds depend on the ratio of α and τ .
For all private mechanisms, we use δ = 0.0001.
6.1 Result Discussion on Artificial Data
Figure 1 visualizes the mean absolute error (with standard deviation as error
bars) for runs of RRMinHash (top) and NoisyMinHash (bottom) for privacy
budgets of ε = 4 (left) and ε = 6 (right) and choices 2, 3, 5 of the B parameter
(blue/red/green lines). With respect to RRMinHash and a privacy budget of ε = 4,
we notice that for each choice of τ the trend is that smaller B values produce
smaller absolute error, which is in accordance with our analysis in Section 4.
(Larger B values can be found on the supplemental website; they performed
much worse.) For vectors of 50 elements, the smallest MAE error is achieved with
the smallest choice of K, resulting in an MAE of around 0.35. The error shrinks
to around 0.15 for 500 elements (with K of around 20), and 0.05 for vectors
with 2 000 elements (with K around 80). The linear increase of K with τ further
motivates the choice of K in Theorem 2. Increasing the privacy budget to ε = 6
further decreases the error but results in the same trends. We note that a growing
privacy budget also corresponds to a larger K choice, again as motivated in
Theorem 2. Increasing K will sometimes result in worse error because of integer
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Fig. 2. Results on synthetic vectors with τ ∈ {50, 500, 2000}, privacy budget ε ∈ {2, 6},
and vectors with Jaccard similarity of 0.5. Blue, red, green lines represent runs with
RRMinHash, NoisyMinHash, Range-2 MinHash (non-private), respectively. There is only
one line for MinHash because its error is independent of the vector size.
constraints in Lemma 2. From a practical point of view, one should choose K as
large as possible before this increase occurs. The trends are identical with regard
to NoisyMinHash, but it is much clearer that a smaller choice of B is preferable
(as motivated in the proof of Theorem 3). We achieve an MAE of around 0.43,
0.18, 0.1 for vectors of size 50, 500, 2000 and ε = 4, respectively, slightly worse
than RRMinHash.
Figure 2 sets our two mechanisms in relation to MinHash with B = 2 and
a privacy budget of 2 (left) and 6 (right). For ε = 2, we need large vectors to
guarantee an error that is roughly a factor of two larger than that achieved by
MinHash. For ε = 6, both larger vectors allow for an estimation vector that
is nearly as small as MinHash. Again, RRMinHash achieves smaller error than
NoisyMinHash, in particular for larger privacy budgets.
We conclude that RRMinHash with B = 2 is a good choice in all considered
experiments on artificial data. For small privacy budget, large user vectors
are needed to get small estimation errors. A larger privacy budget allows to
accommodate smaller vectors.
6.2 Results on Real-World Data
Table 1 summarizes the observed results for runs on the Last.FM and MovieLens
datasets. Again, we set MinHash in relation to RRMinHash and NoisyMinHash.
Motivated by the observations above we only discuss the case B = 2.
We observe that RRMinHash achieves equal or better quality than NoisyMinHash
in all measurements, so we focus the comparison on MinHash and RRMinHash.
First, we note that the datasets are rather difficult. Even standard MinHash
with B = 2 does not achieve close to perfect recall, which means that all vectors
are rather close to each other. The Last.FM dataset provides very small user
vectors. Accordingly there is a big difference between the quality achieved by the
two algorithms. For a privacy budget of ε = 4, the quality is between a factor
of around 10 (R@10) and of around 3 (R@100, Approx) worse if solving the
similarity search task on private vectors. For a privacy budget of ε = 8, these
factors shrink to 1.5-3. With regard to MovieLens, we observe that it is difficult
for MinHash to achieve high recall values for τ = 50. Results for RRMinHash are
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Dataset Algorithm R@10 R@50 R@100 Approx
Last.FM (τ = 20) MinHash 0.42 0.72 0.82 0.55
RRMinHash 0.04 / 0.16 0.15 / 0.38 0.25 / 0.51 0.19 / 0.35
NoisyMinHash 0.03 / 0.06 0.11 / 0.19 0.19 / 0.31 0.16 / 0.23
MovieLens (τ = 50) MinHash 0.13 0.34 0.47 0.61
RRMinHash 0.02 / 0.05 0.09 / 0.17 0.18 / 0.28 0.49 / 0.53
NoisyMinHash 0.01 / 0.02 0.05 / 0.11 0.11 / 0.21 0.49 / 0.50
MovieLens (τ = 100) MinHash 0.31 0.62 0.75 0.72
RRMinHash 0.04 / 0.07 0.12 / 0.24 0.22 / 0.36 0.52 / 0.57
NoisyMinHash 0.04 / 0.04 0.09 / 0.15 0.18 / 0.27 0.52 / 0.54
MovieLens (τ = 500) MinHash 0.58 0.93 0.99 0.83
RRMinHash 0.19 / 0.31 0.65 / 0.76 0.91 / 0.96 0.72 / 0.76
NoisyMinHash 0.14 / 0.25 0.63 / 0.69 0.90 / 0.92 0.71 / 0.73
Table 1. Results on real-world datasets for different quality measures and privacy
budget ε of 4 and 8 (split up via “/” in individual cells).
again a factor 3-6 worse for privacy budget 4, with the exception of the relative
approximation that is rather close (0.49 vs. 0.61). Quality increases slowly from
50 to 100 items, and rapidly for 500 items (because of its small size).
We summarize that there is a clear trade-off between the utility and privacy of
the proposed mechanisms. The results on artificial and real-world data show that
to ensure good utility under a small privacy budget, user vectors have to contain
many items, say in the 100s. Many of the theoretical choices translated well into
practice. Most interestingly, while the upper bounds in the theory section painted
an unclear picture about the utility at a fixed privacy budget, our empirical
analysis clearly suggests that RRMinHash is both easier to implement and achieves
higher utility for the same privacy budget.
7 Related Work
The paper by Kenthapadi [11] shows how to estimate vector differences under the
`2 norm in a differentially private setting in the centralized model of differential
privacy. More precisely, their algorithm has privacy guarantees with respect to
a single element change (i.e., one user changes one item). In very recent work,
Dhaliwal et al. [4] show how to achieve the same guarantees when the privacy-
guarantees are over the change of a fraction of a user vector in the central model.
Both approaches apply a Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform [9] and add noise of a
certain scale to the resulting matrix. Our NoisyMinHash approach can be seen as
a natural generalization of their method, but there are some stand-alone features
such as the mapping to B buckets.
With respect to similarity estimation under Jaccard similarity, the paper by
Riazi et al. [15] describes a privacy-preserving approach for similarity estimation
both for inner product similarity (using SimHash [3]) and Jaccard similarity
(using MinHash). Their privacy notion does not satisfy differential privacy.
The paper by Yan et al. [17] is closest to our approach. It discusses an LDP
approach based on MinHash by selecting certain hash values in a differentially
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private manner using the exponential mechanism. As we argue in Appendix A,
their approach does not provide the guarantees they state and quickly degrades
to a basic MinHash approach without noise addition.
Concurrent to our work, Pagh and Stausholm [14] describe LDP sketches for
approximating the number of items in a set. Their sketches are linear, which
allows them to approximate the size of the union and the intersection of two
sets, and thus their Jaccard similarity. In contrast to our bounds, their bounds
rely on the universe size of set elements. It would be interesting to compare their
mechanism to ours in a practical setting, in particular because their lower-order
error terms [14, Theorem 1] suggest that they need much larger vectors than the
ones considered in our empirical study in Section 6.
Finally, this paper studied the privacy/utility-tradeoff achievable with our
proposed methods. While an important issue, it does not discuss (un)desirable
privacy budgets, which will be application-specific and lack consensus [6].
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A Review of “Locally Private Jaccard Similarity
estimation” by Yan et al.
In this section, we will consider the approach of Yan et al. [17]. We will first
describe their approach, and then discuss short-comings of their analysis.
A.1 Similarity Estimation in [17]
The approach of Yan et al. in [17] works as follows. First, choose K MinHash
functions h1, . . . , hK and distribute them to the users. Let xu be the user vector
containing N elements. For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, do the following: (i) apply hash
function hi to the user vector, keep track of the order of the N elements under
hi, and (ii) choose an element using the Exponential mechanism [8] with utility
function that gives utility N − 1 to the first (smallest) element, and goes down
to utility 0 for the last element under the random order. The response of the
user is the K elements chosen in this way.
Given two responses x̂ and ŷ, [17] returns the value |x̂ ∩ ŷ|/K.
A.2 Criticism
We will focus on the following main issues:
1. Their profile perturbation using the expontial mechanism is not (ε, 0)-
differentially private.
2. Their estimation algorithm is not an unbiased estimator of the Jaccard
similarity.
3. Their self-adaption mechanism quickly degrades to pure MinHash.
With regard to the first point, we note that each user applies the exponential
mechanism to choose among their set of values, i.e., the actual hash values
obtained for their vector. All values different from those have zero probability of
being chosen. This, however, cannot be differential private, quoting [8, Page 38]:
It is important that the range of potential prices [values] is independent
of the actual bids [the hash values which were observed for the user].
Otherwise there would exist a price [value] with non-zero weight in one
dataset and zero weight in a neighboring dataset, violating differential
privacy.
For their approach, this means that if two user vectors differ in exactly one
element, there is a non-zero probability that this value is picked for one vector,
and a zero probability in the other vector (because it is not present). This violates
differential privacy.
With regard to the second point, just returning the number of collisions (over
K) in the perturbed sketches is not an unbiased estimator. It is well-known
that if x and y have Jaccard similarity J(x, y), the collision probability under
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a single minhash value is exactly J(x, y). Repeating the process K times, let d
be the number of hash collisions. The unbiased estimator is then d/K, with an
error of
√
1/K. This is the value that they were to report in their Definition 2.
However, this process does not generalize if they pick values using the Exponential
mechanism. For example, if one vector reports the second-smallest hash value,
and the other reports the smallest hash value, the collision probabiltiy is not
J(x, y). It is easy to see that their estimate does not reflect the Jaccard similarity
in their plots, e.g., Figure 3 (A)–(C). The baseline does not recover the distance,
independent of the epsilon value.
The question does remains why they get good results for their other approaches
in their Figure 3. This brings us to 3.: their so-called “self-adaptation”. Using
self-adaption, they restrict the space of choices for the Exponential mechanism
even further. Given the parameter choices they mention at [17, Page 8], for ε = 1,
the exponential mechanism chooses only between the smallest and second-smallest
element, for ε ≥ 1.2 it chooses only from the set containing only the smallest
hash value. Since this defaults to just using MinHash, it is not surprising that
they measure a small estimation error. However, the sketch is just the MinHash
sketch, and since all hash functions are shared, this clearly violates differential
privacy: the mechanism is deterministic at this point.
B A Useful Utility Bound for the Laplace Mechanism
For completeness, we reproduce Theorem 3.8 in [8] with the notation of our
setup.
Theorem 4. Let f : {0, 1}m → [B]K , and let y = f(x) + (Y1, . . . , YK) with
Yi ∼ Lap(∆/ε). Then for all δ ∈ (0, 1]:
Pr
[
‖f(x)− y‖∞ ≥ ln(K/δ)
∆
ε
]
≤ δ.
C A Running Example
Figure 3 provides a running example of our setup and the different mechanisms.
We consider two users that can have items in the set {1, . . . , 6}. User x has items
{2, 3, 5}, user y has items {3, 5, 6}. Their Jaccard similarity is thus 2/4 = 0.5.
Users have access to K = 4 MinHash functions that map to B = 3 buckets
{0, 1, 2}. Applying these functions to user x gives the sketch x∗ = (2, 0, 1, 2),
applying them to y’s user results in y∗ = (2, 0, 2, 2). These two vectors are made
private using either Generalized Randomized Response or addition of Laplace
noise.
In the first case, consider a probability of p∗ = 3/4, which means that each
user randomizes their answer with probability 1/4. For x∗, the third element is
flipped, and the random choice from {0, 1, 2} \ {1} results in the answer 2. The
private vector x̂ is thus (2, 0, 2, 2). For y∗, the first element is flipped and the
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Fig. 3. Overview of the algorithms presented in this work. Two users whose vectors
have Jaccard similarity 0.5 apply 4 range-3 MinHash functions to their vectors of length
m = 6. In the top row, each user uses randomize response with flip probability 1/4 to
generate their private vectors. In the bottom row, they use noise drawn from a Laplace
distribution. The result of the estimation is shown to the right.
random choice among {0, 1, 2} \ {2} results in 0. The answer ŷ is thus (0, 0, 2, 2).
We count 2 collisions between x̂ and ŷ, and plugging this into the estimation
formula (1) gives an estimate of 0.64.
In the second case, consider that Laplace noise is added with scale 0.1.
Each user independently adds noise by drawing 4 samples from Lap(0.1) and
adding the samples to the original vector. This results in the two vectors x̂ =
(1.98, 0.02, 1.23, 1.08) and ŷ = (2.49, 1.68, 2.03, 1.50) (rounded to two digits).
Computing the squared Euclidean distance between these vectors and adjusting
for the parameters as stated in (5) results in an estimate of 0.32 for the Jaccard
similarity of x and y.
